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ABSTRACT 
This study explores the evolution of fiscal resource distribution in 
Pakistan. Pakistan is a federation comprising four provinces, federally-
administered areas, and the Islamabad Capital Territory. Being a central type of 
government, most of the revenues are collected by the centre and then 
redistributed vertically between the federal and the provincial governments, and 
horizontally among the provinces. Provinces then also redistribute revenues 
among lower tiers of the government, through a revenue-sharing formula.  A 
thorough look at the history indicates that this process has been complex and has 
a far-reaching impact. A less systematic approach has been adopted to 
decentralise the financial matters. Over time, the divisible pool has expanded 
due to heavy reliance on indirect taxes as well as improvement in the collection.  
Population is the sole distribution criteria, adopted in all NFC awards from the 
divisible pool. This has raised friction among the provinces, necessitating 
inclusion of other potential variables evolved from international best practices. 
In addition to that, absence of technical experts and permanency of the NFC is 
another impediment. The NFC is supposed to provide the framework for 
amicable distribution of resources between the federal and the provincial 
governments for the joint goal of development and prosperity. 
 
JEL classification:  H71, H72, H73, H77 
Keywords: NFC, Pakistan, Fiscal Federalism, Rule and Discretion, 
Political Economy, Population, Subventions, Doing the 
Business of Government 

 
* 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Pakistan is a federation comprising of four provinces, federally 
administered tribal areas, northern areas and Islamabad Capital Territory. Being 
a central type of government, most of the revenue are collected by centre and 
then redistributed vertically between federal and provincial governments and 
horizontally among the provinces. While the provinces further redistribute the 
revenue through a revenue sharing formula amongst the lower tiers of the 
government. The resource transfer paradigm had been a major bone of 
contention among the federation and the federating units. With the 
implementation of devolution plan, the government has devolved various 
functional assignments to the local tiers of the administration. Nevertheless, 
there are large fiscal deficits among these local tiers on the part of public service 
delivery as of their assignments, mainly due to concentration of revenue 
collection at centre through major tax heads. For proper service delivery there is 
a need for higher share for the provinces in the NFC awards. These resource 
transfers can be broadly categorised as systematic (formula based) method of 
resource transfer and the other being random method (grants etc.). Under the 
systematic basis there are four stages [Jaffery and Sadaqat (2006)]; firstly, 
revenue sharing occurs at federal and provincial government through National 
Finance Commission (NFC), secondly, from provincial government to local 
government through Provincial Finance Commission (PFC); thirdly, from 
federal to local government and lastly from local to local government (e.g. 
District Government to Tehsil Municipal Administration). On the other hand 
random transfers include: development/special grants, executive’s discretionary 
funds and parliamentarian funds, etc. In this paper the focus is on the systematic 
resource transfers from Federal to Provinces only.  
The resources transfer includes revenue shares, grants, straight transfers 
and loans. Among the revenues that are shared come from income tax, sales tax, 
custom duties, and excise duties [Jaffery and Sadaqat (2006)]. In addition there 
are other types of revenues, called straight transfers, are collected by federal 
government but paid to provinces, e.g. royalties etc. On the other hand from 
revenue consideration provinces are also assigned collection of minor tax 
assignments such as agricultural tax, stamp duties, motor vehicle tax etc and 
others which are levied and retained by provincial govt. Further all non-tax 
receipts are levied and retained by Federal government. 
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National Finance Commission (NFC) has undergone many changes and 
has dynamically grown to its present shape. NFC is established by law for the 
smooth and judicious re-distribution of resources collected by centre according 
to the need and goals for development of federation and federating units. NFC is 
constituted under Article 160(1) of the 1973 constitution (Annex I) and 
proposed to be held at the intervals of five years. Its members are Federal 
Finance Minister (Chairman), Provincial Finance Ministers and other 
concerning experts which the President may appoint after consultation with 
provincial Governors [Constitution of Pakistan (1973)].  
The main charter of NFC is to recommend on the following [Pakistan 
(2006b)]: 
 (1) The distribution of specified taxes, duties between federation and 
provinces. 
 (2) The disbursement of grants to provincial governments. 
 (3) The borrowing powers exercised by federal and provincial 
governments. 
 (4) Any other financial matter referred to commission. 
As per law NFC is intended to have an amicable mechanism for resource 
sharing formula between the federation and provinces and amongst the provinces. 
On ground it faced difficulties from time to time which barred its development. 
There are only three awards (recommendations) as such, in the last 34 years by 
National Finance Commission. The most recent NFC award is of year 2006 which 
was announced by the President, after a deadlock between provinces and federal 
government on conforming to one distribution formula. During the delay period 
interim NFC award were used in order to make transfers.  
The present study evaluates NFC award and its related issues in historical 
perspective of Pakistan. Further to provide some recommendations for an optimal 
distribution of resources between federal and provincial governments. The paper 
consists of four sections. After the introduction, next section is of historical 
perspective, with four sub headings i.e. Pre-independence resource distribution, post 
independence revenues sharing, during one unit period and lastly after 1973 
constitution where all the seven NFC awards (following 1973 constitution) are 
briefly described. In the third section over time development of NFC awards is 
critically analysed. The final section comprises of conclusion and recommendation. 
 
2.  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
This chapter analyses the historical aspects of resource sharing between 
the federation and the federating units. It has been further divided into four 
subparts as mentioned earlier i.e. pre-independence state, post-independence 
scenario, during One Unit period and awards following the 1973 constitution of 
Pakistan. These are discussed here one by one. 
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2.1.  Pre-independence Revenue Sharing (Niemeyer Award) 
Prior to independence, Niemeyer Award (under the 1935 Act) was 
followed to distribute the resources between federal and provincial governments 
of the British India. Under this award sales tax was a provincial subject while 
income tax collections to be redistributed were prescribed as 50 percent of the 
total collection. Even after the creation of Pakistan, till March 1952, same award 
was followed although with some adjustment in railway budget, sharing of 
income and sales tax [Pakistan (1991)]. In addition Sindh and NWFP were given 
annual grants of Rs 10 million and Rs 10.5 million, respectively. However when 
the financial position of Sindh improved, these grants were used to settle its 
federal debt thus it was virtually getting no grants at the time of independence. 
 
2.2.  Post-independence Revenue Sharing (Raisman Award)  
After the independence, Sir Jeremy Raisman was assigned to formulate a 
feasible revenue sharing formula between federation and federating units of the 
country. Thus Raisman formula was presented in December, 1947 [Pakistan 
(1991) and Jaffery and Sadaqat (2006)] and subsequently adopted on April 1, 
1952.  
In that formula, to overcome the poor financial situation arising from 
partition federal government was given 50 percent ad hoc share of sales tax to 
cope with its financial crises under Raisman award. Out of the proceeds of 50 
percent income tax East Pakistan government got 45 percent of the federal 
divisible pool while West Pakistan got the remaining share. This share was 
distributed as 27, 12, 8, 4, 0.6, 0.6, and 2.8 percent amongst provinces of Punjab, 
Sindh, NWFP and Bhawalpur, Khairpur, Balochistan states union and residual1, 
respectively [Pakistan (1991)]. Under this award the subvention to NWFP was 
Rs 12.5 million. 
 
2.3.  Revenue Sharing under One Unit 
Four provinces NWFP, Sindh, Punjab, and Balochistan of West Pakistan 
were declared as one unit during 1955. Earlier, these provinces were considered 
as separate identities as of East Pakistan. Therefore, after these arrangements 
there were only two units namely East and West Pakistan. Two awards for year 
1961 and 1964 were announced during that period. At that time the resources 
were distributed only amongst East Pakistan and West Pakistan. 
 
2.3.1.  The 1961 Award 
Under the award, out of the divisible pool (70 percent of sales tax plus 
other taxes), East Pakistan and West Pakistan got 54 and 46 percent share, 
                                                 
1The states that may join Pakistan after the independence. 
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respectively. 30 percent of sales tax was specified to the provinces on the bases 
of collection in their respective areas. While the remaining duties on agricultural 
land and capital value tax on immovable property were given to the units as per 
their collection [Pakistan (1991)]. 
 
2.3.2.  The 1964 Award 
The 1964 National Finance Commission was set up under article 144 of 
the 1962 constitution. The divisible pool consisted of collection from income 
tax, sales tax, excise duty and export duty. However 30 percent of sales tax was 
distributed in accordance with its collection in each province.  The respective 
share out of divisible pool between centre and provinces were 35:65 percent. 
The share of East Pakistan and West Pakistan remained unchanged at 54 percent 
and 46 percent. However, on 1st July 1970 the West Pakistan was disband into 
Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan, thus its share of 46 percent was 
distributed as 56.5, 23.5, 15.5 and 4.5 percent respectively among the new 
provinces [Pakistan (1991)]. 
 
2.3.3.  National Finance Committee 1970 
A committee2 was set up to recommend for the inter-governmental resource 
sharing under the Federal Finance Minister on April 1970. The divisible pool 
remained unchanged, however the share of the federal and provincial governments 
in the divisible pool was considered to be 20:80 percent respectively. Out of the 
provincial share 54 percent was given to East Pakistan, while the remaining 46 
percent was distributed among the rest of the provinces as is given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Provincial Share in the 1970 Award 
Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan 
56.50% 23.50% 15.50% 4.50% 
Source:  Pakistan (1991). 
 
However after the separation of East Pakistan the provinces that 
constituted West Pakistan continued to receive their respective shares in the 
same proportion as stated above where as the size of revenue pie changed. 
 
2.4.  Financial Arrangements in the 1973 Constitution 
Through the 1973 constitution, it was made obligatory for the government 
to compose NFC at an interval extending not more than 5 years for the amicable 
                                                 
2For the first time instead of a commission a committee was constituted which has lower 
capacity as of a commission. 
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resource distribution among the federation and their respective units. This was 
the period when the West Pakistan (existing Pakistan) started its journey after 
the separation of East Pakistan. The following sections briefly overview the 
developments after the 1973 constitution: 
 
2.4.1.  The 1st NFC Award 1974  
In this award fewer taxes were included in the divisible pool which 
consisted of income tax, sales tax and export duty while the criterion used for 
resource redistribution was recommended to be population. Resources were 
vertically distributed among federal and provincial governments at a fixed ratio 
of 20:80 as before. As population being the sole criterion for distribution, 
Punjab’s share had increased from 56.50 percent (1970 award) to 60.25 percent 
while the three other provinces suffered, with Sindh suffering the most. The 
horizontal resource sharing among the provinces, under 1974 NFC award is 
presented at Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Provincial Share According to the 1974 NFC Award 
Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan 
60.25% 22.50% 13.39% 3.86% 
Source:  Pakistan (1991). 
 
Annual grants of Rs 50 and Rs 100 millions respectively were also 
allocated to Balochistan and NWFP government’s to compensate their weak 
financial situation.  
 
2.4.2.  The 2nd NFC Award 1979 
President General Zia-ul-Haq constituted the second NFC under the 
Chairmanship of Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Federal Finance Minister in 1979. 
Unfortunately, it never held any meeting and resultantly made no proposals. 
Therefore, for resource distribution in the interim period, the 1974 award was 
followed. After the new census of 1981, population proportions changed and 
resource shares were adjusted, accordingly. This led to some what improved 
situation in Balochistan and Sindh while the share of NWFP remained 
unchanged. New resource distribution according to population share for the 
provinces is given in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Provincial Share, 1979 Award 
Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan 
57.97% 23.34% 13.39% 5.30% 
Source:  Pakistan (2006b). 
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2.4.3.  The 3rd NFC Award 1985 
The third NFC was also composed during the President Zia-ul-Haq era in 
1985. Although, the commission under the Chairmanship of Dr Mahbubul Haq, 
Federal Finance Minister, held nine meetings in three years, but could not 
finalise its recommendations. This was mainly contributed due to the internal as 
well as external political instability. Thus the third NFC award 1985 as of its 
previous 1979 award also failed to produce any fruits. The resource distribution 
from divisible pools remains same as of 1974 up to 1990. 
 
2.4.4.  The 4th NFC Award 1990 
After almost 16 years of break in declaring a consensus NFC award, 
the 1990 NFC award came up with some positive recommendations in April 
1991 under the democratic government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The 
commission was headed by Mr Sartaj Aziz, Federal Finance Minister. The 
most significant development under this award was the expansion of the 
divisible pool.  The excise duties on sugar and tobacco which were part of 
non divisible pool earlier now become a part of divisible pool in this award. 
The divisible pool under fourth NFC award 1990 consists of number of 
taxes/duties which include income tax, sales tax, export duty and excise 
duty. However, custom duty still remained with Federal government. The 
commission failed to achieve consensus for the diversification in the 
resource sharing formula despite the demands from the provinces. Thus still 
population remained the sole element for revenue sharing criteria in the NFC 
award. Revenue deficits were adopted as the basis for determining the 
amount of subvention requirement. The sharing of the divisible pool 
between federal and provincial governments continued to remain at 20:80 
percent, respectively [Ghaus and Pasha (1994)]. 
However, from the resource transfer side the 1990 award significantly 
increased the volume of provincial shares in the revenue collected (by 
federal government) by around 18 percent as compared to 1974 award. This 
increase was due to the inclusion of excise duty on two items (sugar and 
tobacco) in the divisible pool. This award was a move forward towards fiscal 
decentralisation by extending more financial autonomy to the provinces. In 
addition to this for the first time the provinces right on net hydel profit, 
development surcharge (on gas) and excise duty on crude oil was admitted 
and amounts relocated in the shape of straight transfers to the provinces. 
Resultantly, the transfers to provinces increased from 28 percent (Rs 39 
billions) to 45 percent (Rs 64 billion) of federal tax revenue [Ghaus and 
Pasha (1994)]. The percentage shares which provinces got under this award 
are presented at Table 4. 
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Table 4 
Provincial Share, 1990 Award 
Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan 
57.88% 23.28% 13.54% 5.30% 
Source:  Pakistan (1991). 
 
The proportion of horizontal distribution remained the same because 
population was still the sole criteria for resource distribution and there was no 
census since 1981. However, the volume of money transfer from federal and 
provincial government had increased due to inclusion of more items in the 
divisible pool. On the other hand to meet the developmental need of the 
provinces special grants to the provinces were also provided (Table 5). 
 
Table 5 
Special Annual Grant to Provinces in 4th NFC, 1990 
(Rs Million) 
Amount/Years Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan 
Amount 1000 700 200 100 
Next Years 3 5 3 3 
Source:  Pakistan (1991). 
 
Although, there was an increase in the financial transaction from the 
divisible pool to the provinces and they were also advised to generate funds 
from their own revenues. But the required autonomy to motivate as well as 
capacity building for generating their own revenues was missing [Jaffery and 
Sadaqat (2006)].  
 
2.4.5.  The 5th NFC Award 1996 
Malik Meraj Khalid, the caretaker Prime Minister, constituted NFC in 
December, 1996. Mr Shahid Javed Burki, Finance Minister was its Chairman. 
The commission announced the award in February 1997. All taxes/duties were 
included in the divisible pool. Which comprised: (a) income tax (b) wealth tax 
(c) capital value tax (d) sales tax (e) export duties (f) custom duties (g) excise 
duties (excluding excise duty on gas, charged at wellhead), and (h) any other tax 
collected by federal government. In addition to that, royalties on crude oil and 
net development surcharges on natural gas were also given to the provinces. 
Incentive of matching grant was introduced, although up to a certain limit, to the 
provincial governments that if they exceed their revenue growth target of 14.2  
percent they would be provided matching grants [Pakistan (1996)]. The 
maximum limits of matching grants specified to different provinces are 
presented at Table 6. 
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Table 6 
Matching Grants under the 1996 Award 
(Rs Million) 
Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan 
500 500 100 100 
Source:  Pakistan (1996). 
 
An important aspect of 1996 NFC award was that it bifurcated the public 
expenditures into priority and non-priority expenditures. The priority 
expenditure were described as expenses on defense, debt servicing, social sector 
and development expenditures while those on general administration, 
community services and law and order were termed to be the non-priority 
expenditures [Sabir (2001)].  This was done to solve the emerging financial and 
other challenges, issues and accordingly prioritise the path of development. 
However, due to the inclusion of all taxes in the divisible pool, the share 
of provincial government from the divisible pool changed drastically. The share 
to the federal government was assigned to be 62.5 percent (earlier it was 20 
percent) while that of provinces to be 37.5 percent (earlier it was 80 percent). 
This ratio was actually suggested by the 1985 NFC but was adopted later on in 
this award. Then the shares in the divisible pool were further revised according 
to 1998 population census with effect from 1st July 2002. 
The drastic shift in provincial shares was based on the optimistic 
projections of higher GDP growth and desired inflation rate. But during the 
period when the award was going to be exercised, the provinces were adversely 
affected due to certain internal and external shocks and the economy did not 
responded accordingly. So there is a perception that if the previous award of 
1990 still continued to prevail at that time, the provinces would have been in a 
better financial position [Sabir (2001)]. With no change in resource sharing 
element, population still being the sole criteria, the percentage provincial share 
remained the same as with maximum 57.88 and minimum 5.3 percent of Punjab 
and Balochistan, respectively (Table 7).  
 
Table 7 
Percentage Provincial Share, 1996 Award 
Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan 
57.88 23.28 13.54 5.30 
Source:  Pakistan (1996). 
 
Keeping in view the meager financial situation in NWFP and Balochistan, 
special grants of 3.3 and 4 billions rupees were given to these provinces for the 
next five years (Table 8). These amounts were also subject to be adjusted in the 
line of inflation. 
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Table 8 
Special Annual Grant to Provinces in the 5th NFC Award 
(Rs Billion) 
Amount/Years Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan 
Amount – – 3.31* 4.08* 
Next Years – – 5 5 
Source:  Pakistan (1996). 
          * To be adjusted for inflation. 
 
2.4.6.  The 6th NFC Award 2000 
On 22nd July 2000 General Pervaiz Musharraf, President of Pakistan 
constituted NFC under the Chairmanship of Mr Shaukat Aziz, the Federal 
Finance Minister. It held 11 meetings since then but could not finalise its 
recommendations due to lack of consensus among its members. Provinces were 
demanding for higher share in the divisible pool (upto 50 percent) as well as the 
diversification of the distribution criteria. 
 
2.4.7.  The 7th NFC Award 2006 
Similarly the new NFC was constituted on 21st July, 2005, but it met with 
the same result by having no consensus among the members to have a mutually 
acceptable mechanism for judicious resource distribution. This gave rise to a 
deadlock and finally all the provincial Chief Ministers vested the authority to the 
President to announce a just award. As a result the President under Article 
160(6) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, through Ordinance 
No. 1 of 2006, made amendment in the “Distribution of Revenues and Grants-
in-Aid Order, 1997”. Consequently the new NFC was announced to take effect 
from 1st July 2006 [Pakistan (2006 a)]. 
Under the award, the provincial share was revised and decided to be 45  
percent (share in total divisible pool + grants) for the 1st financial year and 
would reach 50  percent with subsequent increase of 1  percent per annum. 
The divisible pool consisted of the items i.e. (a) income tax (b) wealth tax (c) 
capital value tax (d) sales tax (e) export duties (f) custom duties (g) excise 
duties (excluding excise duty on gas, charged at wellhead), and (h) any other 
tax collected by federal government [Pakistan (2006a)]. With the robust 
economic growth during the period of award the Federal Government has 
enough resources to distribute among the provinces. In the financial year 
2007-08, total amount of Rs 497 billion is projected to be given to the 
provinces, which was Rs 418 billion last year. This would be 46 percent of the 
divisible pool i.e. 1 percent higher than previous year’s allocation [Federal 
Budget Speech (2007-08)]. The size of the pie has considerably increased 
(Figure 1). Net proceeds equal to 1/6th of Sales tax are given to the provinces 
to transfer it further to the district government and cantonment boards. Its 
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share for Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan was 50.00, 34.85, 9.93 and 
5.22 percent, respectively [Pakistan (2006a)]. While the provincial share out 
of the divisible pool is given as (Table 9). 
 
Table 9 
Percentage Provincial Share, 2006 Award 
Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan 
57.36 23.71 13.82 5.11 
Source:  Pakistan (2006a). 
 
Total subvention/grants for provinces were enhanced from Rs 8.7 billion 
to Rs 27.75 billion which will further increase annually in line with the growth 
of net proceeds. Punjab and Sindh which were not given any grants in the 
previous award, but in this award they were also entitled to receive 3.05 and 
5.83 billion rupees (Table 10). So the total increase in the resource transfer from 
Federal to Provincial government in the form of share and subventions has an 
increase of almost 51 billion [Pakistan (2006b)].  
 
Table 10 
Special Grants to Provinces under the 2006 Award 
(Rs Billion) 
    2005-06 (BE**) 2006-07 (Estimates) 
Punjab – 3.05 
Sindh – 5.83 
NWFP 3.9* 9.71 
Balochistan 4.8* 9.16 
Total 8.7 27.75 
Source:  Pakistan (2006b). 
          * Adjusted for inflation. 
        ** Budget Estimates. 
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Fig. 2.  Straight Transfers to Provinces 
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Source:  Pakistan (2006b). 
 
The other important development in this award was the increase in the 
straight transfers of royalties on Gas and Crude Oil, excise duty on Gas and Gas 
Development Surcharge. In addition, the NWFP Government is also receiving 
net hydel profit from WAPDA at a capped level of Rs 6 billion annually 
[Pakistan (2006b)]. There is substantial annual increase in these amounts over 
time (Figure 2). It is important to indicate that Sindh is the highest receiver of 
the amount through straight transfers. Current NFC award gives province a 
higher command on monetary resources and their revenue continue to grow over 
time as well. 
In addition to straight transfers, Federal Government under Public Sector 
Development Programme (PSDP) also finances the province’s different 
development projects either with full funds or with 50:50 shares. The non-
developments funds transferred to provinces include compensation for victims 
of natural calamity and any uncontrolled situation.  
 
3.  DEVELOPMENT OF NFC AWARDS OVER TIME 
Financial resources are playing imperative role for the development. Its 
judicial and equitable distribution is necessary to build up any under develop or 
under privilege area/location. The current state of resource distribution has 
evolved over time. Various improvements have been made in the resource 
sharing mechanism among the federal and provincial governments. In the 
following section we would describe the important aspects of different awards 
and their impact on the fiscal decentralisation in the country.  
In Pakistan fiscal federalism remained a focal issue of confederation. Out 
of total of seven commissions (constituted after 1973 constitution), only four has 
come up with additional parameters to distribute the resources among the 
federating units. Over time the federal government had been more centralised 
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rather than devolving the affairs both from the financing and expenditure side to 
lower tier. This has poorly affected the performance and created disincentives 
for the provincial governments to work efficiently. The main responsibilities of 
Central government are to determine the foreign policy, defense matters, 
communications, currency and debt servicing. In addition to that it has the 
responsibility of general administration, maintaining law and order, look after 
the industrial development and elements of public welfare including education 
and health. Thus in order to take care of all these matters the federal government 
requires resources. 
With the passage of time, federal government has overstretched itself 
into several matters that are purely the provincial subject. This has increased 
both administrative and financial burden on federal government. These 
augmented activities include roads, irrigation, some aspects of agricultural 
sector (like quality control), culture and tourism, youth affairs, and rural 
development. These are the sectors which can be transferred to the provinces 
to save time and money. Specifically, when the government is eyeing 
towards devolution of power from centre to local government, it is necessary 
that these tiers of government should have proper finances. The federal 
government generates about 93 percent resources despite the fact that its 
share in total expenditure is only 72 percent. On the contrary, the provinces 
are left with only 7 percent resources although it account for around 28 
percent aggregate expenditure [Khan (2006)].  The argument behind the 
higher collection by the federation is based on the achievement of equity, 
efficiency, economy, and the federal government’s ability to levy and collect 
[Kardar (2006)]. But provincial and local governments are thus left with 
lesser opportunities to generate their own resources because the available 
resources are already exhausted. Therefore, it results in dependency of 
provinces on the federation for resource transfer. 
NFC, although had less agreements of award, remained very consistent 
with the population as the only criterion for resource distribution between 
federal and provincial governments. It gives us an idea about the stagnancy and 
lack of coordination in our policy making. It is worth mentioning that population 
is not the sole criterion for resource distribution anywhere in the world 
otherwise. Throughout, the world various factors like revenue generation, 
poverty, population density, income distribution, backwardness, etc are used to 
disaggregate the federal tax revenues. Consequently, over the period of time 
there is no serious shift in resource distribution among the provinces despite vast 
differences in the economic conditions of the masses, future prospects and 
strategic objectives for different federating units of the country. Figure 3 and 4 
depict the overall situation of NFC award and its percentage allocation over the 
period of time among different provinces. (See Annex II) 
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Fig. 3.  NFC over Time 
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Fig. 4.  Year-wise Allocation among Provinces 
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Rules are non-discretionary and transparent, and it leads to establishment of 
trust and expectations of the interacting economic agents to increase their 
developmental activities and therefore economic prosperity. There are significant 
differences in the standards of living across provinces and even within urban-rural 
areas. Although, rural-urban disparities come under the umbrella of Provincial 
Finance Commission (PFC) but the facts remains that provinces can remove these 
disparities only when they have sufficient funds transfer from central government. 
Varying gap between the real per capita GDP of rural and urban areas in different 
provinces is depicted at Figure 5. (See Annex III) What is needed to be done is that 
NFC Ove ti e 
Year Wise Allocation
8  
6  
4  
2  
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proper attention should be given to various elements to achieve equity as well as 
develop harmony among the provinces. NWFP has been facing maximum 
disparities in rural and urban income, followed by Sindh and Punjab. Although, in 
Balochistan there is a lesser gap but it is because of lack of urban development as 
well as lesser economic opportunities in cities.  
 
Fig. 5.  Real GDP per Capita, Provinces 
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Source: National Human Development Report UNDP (2003). 
 
The major shift in government policy towards fiscal decentralisation can 
be seen in 1996 NFC award. Prior to this award fewer taxes were shared 
between federation and federating units so the provinces had to depend on 
grants. In this award all taxes/duties were included in the pool to increase 
transparency, simplicity and predictability. But this was one side of the picture, 
because there was an unprecedented and sudden change in resource sharing 
formula among federal and provincial governments. Hence, the actual flow of 
transfer might not be changed significantly at all. There was a drastic change in 
the share of Federal/Provincial governments from 20:80 to 62.5:37.5 percent. 
This dramatic change could not be absorbed by the provinces and they fell into 
acute shortage of revenue funds. Still the argument of efficient revenue 
generation and the prevalence of desired inflation rate were the culprits. But 
none of the above happened accordingly and provinces were trapped into serious 
resource shortage.  
In May 1999 provinces were given 1/6th of Sales tax in order to deal with 
the financial shortages that aroused due to the abolition of Zila and Octroi tax.3 
                                                 
3Initially, 12.5 percent sales tax was proposed but after abolition of Zila and Octroi it was 
increased to 15   percent.  
The increment 2.5 percent was directly transferred to province to compensate Zila and 
Octroi taxes.  
Real GDP per Capita
 15
Due to these problems the federal government decided to address the provincial 
grievances and adjusted the federal/provincial share as 55:45 taking province’s 
demand to announce a just award. But still in 2006 award the only visible 
change was seen in the percentage of revenue sharing between federal and 
provincial governments whereas the criteria for horizontal resource distribution 
still lay its basis on the population. 
The criteria adopted for proportion revenue sharing between Federal and 
Provincial governments has created friction between the two and this frustration 
has resulted in the non-agreement on NFC award. This friction was then 
removed when the federal government agreed to enhance the percentage share 
of provinces to 45 percent that to reach 50 percent (tax revenue + grants) in the 
following five years. This again underlines the justifiability of province’s 
demand earlier. But on the other hand from federal government point of view it 
is argued that overtime whenever there is an increase in the share of provinces it 
has increased the non-developmental expenditures, this is definitely not always 
desired. Provinces on the other hand lack proper projects to improve the living 
standards of its people and pose a serious capacity problem e.g. poverty ratio in 
NWFP was 44 percent while ratio in Balochistan was 37 percent in 1997 
[Jaffery and Sadaqat (2006)] but provincial governments failed to present any 
serious plan to reduce the prevailing difference. 
This pertains to the issue of political economy and public choice. The 
electoral process could lead to such a situation where the federal government 
is hijacked by the larger federating unit, because of majority seats in the 
National Assembly. Although, in the upper house (Senate) all provinces 
have equal representation but they only have power to discuss, not to 
formulate any feasible resource distribution mechanism. Further, the centre 
does not want the federating units to grow independently which would 
reduce the rite of the central government on the affairs of doing the business 
of the government both from the representatives and bureaucracy 
perspective. This could be seen as since independence, 10 awards for 
formula based justified resource sharing have so far been constituted, out of 
which only two (1974, 1999) came from the elected governments. Among 
the other two, 1996 award was announced by a caretaker government, while 
the year 2006 award was announced by the uniform president after NFC 
failed to achieve consensus among the members on an amicable resource 
distribution mechanism. Although in Pakistan, the tax-to-GDP ratio is the 
lowest in region [Sherani (2006)]. Nonetheless there is an increase in 
resource allocation over time, because the total revenues collection has 
improved. Resultantly, the pie to be divided have increased, hence the 
resources transferred from federal to provincial government are improving 
(Figure 6 and Annex IV).  
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Fig. 6.  Federal/Provincial Tax Revenues over Time 
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Source: Economic Survey (Various Issues). 
 
Further the incentives for the provincial governments for matching grants 
(i.e. on exhibiting revenue increase growth of 14.2 percent) and thereby creating 
their credibility for their sustainability also failed due to absence of any concrete 
revenue assignment for resource generation on their own effort coupled with 
lack of capacity and closer voice and accountability of the people to the local 
tiers.   
Major tax assignments are lying with the federal government thus under 
capacitating the provincial governments (Table 11). An important development 
in 1996 award was the distinction of priority such as defense expenditure, debt 
servicing etc. and non-priority expenditure which were ensured by the federal 
government accordingly. This helped in sustaining the trust of both the domestic 
(defense mainly) and the international community (debt) to avoid any economic 
and/or political crises due to perception of default. 
 
Table 11 
Revenue Assignments among the Federal and Provincial Government 
Governments Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes 
Income Tax Sales Tax 
Excise Duty Corporation Tax 
Custom Duty 
Wealth Tax Import Duty 
Property Tax Export Duty 
  Gas & Petroleum Surcharge  
 
 
 
Federal Government 
  Foreign Travel Tax 
Land Revenue  Stamp Duty 
Urban Immovable property tax Motor Vehicle Tax 
Tax on transfer of property  Entertainment Tax 
Agricultural income tax Electricity Duty 
 
 
 
Provincial Government 
Tax on professions and trades   
Source: “Rural Service Delivery in Pakistan”, A study for World Bank (2006). 
Feder / a e
deral Tax Rev nue rovincial Tax Rev nue 
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4.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The main objective of the study was to collate history of resource 
distribution which has taken place over the period of time in Pakistan through 
NFC mechanism. Several issues are identified in this context. There is a need for 
inclusion of other factors like infrastructure, poverty, backwardness, revenue 
generation, environment, etc. to be taken into account for justifiable of resource 
distribution. Even if we look at our neighbouring country India, various criteria 
are used for resource distribution from central to provincial governments. So, in 
order to achieve equity, such policies should be devised which take different 
aspects of development into its account while distributing the resources. 
The issue of resource distribution among federal and provincial 
governments never proved to be simple and is a much complex issue. But when 
we go through the history of NFC, it becomes obvious that the problem of 
resource distribution is never taken seriously. Or it’s a political economy issue, 
where in the game theoretic perspective the stakeholders bargain over the 
resource pie, and due to non-consensus, by will or forced, they retreat to a uni-
variable  criteria based formula which is not optimal. That’s the reason that NFC 
by and large has been unsuccessful to evolve and to tackle the problem of fiscal 
decentralisation, amicably. As there had been little or no consensus achieved at 
times thus giving way to interim awards and grants benefiting the larger 
province. 
There has been no systematic approach to decentralise, capacitate and to 
encourage the provinces by incentivising generation of their own revenues thus 
creating a long term administrative and financial dependence on the centre. The 
resource pie has been increasing at a systematic pace due to the large reliance on 
the indirect taxes. Rather then creating a rule based transparent mechanism of 
resource distribution and increasing the resource flow to downward 
governments. Federal government has been maintaining a status quo by 
reformulating inwardly. Hence trust and expectations development of the 
interacting economic agents to increase their developmental activities is lacking 
resulting to lower economic prosperity. 
Population had remained the sole criteria for resource distribution the 
whole time, which is not the best practice around the world. Throughout the 
period, smaller provinces have asked for adoption of a judicious formula with 
the inclusion of factors such as revenue generation, poverty, backwardness, area 
etc. in the revenue distribution criterion but nothing concrete have taken place. 
Where as in the Provincial Finance Commissions (PFC) there are other criteria 
as well. The Ministry of Inter-Provincial Coordination on 3rd March, 2007 has 
also suggested for the inclusion of two additional factors (backwardness and 
poverty) as revenue sharing elements while announcing NFC award. 
The federal government has been overstretching itself by accepting the 
matters which are purely provincial in nature like roads, rural development, 
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gender issues and so on, for that they keep resources with them as well. So there 
is a need to empower the provincial governments by clearly defining the roles of 
each tier of the government and giving the required resources (both human and 
financial) to them for their planning and development autonomy. This would 
encourage the provinces to contribute towards the development of the country 
by streamlining their capabilities by having a better voice and accountability. 
It is encouraging to note that there is an element of provincial autonomy 
and fiscal decentralisation in recent awards. In the 1990 award and onwards the 
divisible pool has been expanded with the inclusion of more taxes. Thus 
provinces are given more resources and development funds. Similarly an 
incentive of matching grants is another step forward to motivate the provinces 
for their own resource generation and financial autonomy.  
Proper systematic approach to decentralise and to encourage the 
provinces for generating their own revenues should be made.  This would help 
to reduce administrative and resource dependency towards the federation. There 
is need to incorporate provincial grants into their respective resource shares in 
such a way so that the provinces achieve autonomy and become able to devise 
their indigenous development plans. 
Although, federally constituted, but with its ad hoc nature, NFC has failed 
to provide ideal resource distribution criteria. There are no penalties, as such and 
certain provinces have benefited by having no consensus for redistribution. 
Furthermore, the parameter choice is very narrow and sub-optimal, especially 
the population. This is based on census, which is carried out after every 10 years 
and has issues such as demographic dividend, migration, etc. in recent years.  
Therefore, international experiences must be incorporated in the resource 
distribution formula. While announcing NFC award the government should give 
proper importance to following factors which are exercised in the rest of the 
world. The factors that can be incorporated are: 
 (1) Backwardness and development gap. 
 (2) Inverse income distribution (rural urban income disparity). 
 (3) Natural resource endowment.  
 (4) Revenue generation/revenue collection. 
 (5) Population density. 
 (6) Poverty.  
 (7) Area. 
 (8) Non-formula transfers. 
 (9) Environmental consideration. 
There should be a permanent body of NFC, with professionals of the 
subject as consultants to regularly monitor and evaluate the equitable utilisation 
of the award. Visits should be made to different areas and stakeholder 
consultation should be made to have a real look at the situation prevailing there 
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so that the resource allocation can be made more appropriate. Like PFC it should 
have a dynamic interface with other stakeholders in improving the flow of 
funds. The federal assignments should be gradually reduced, both from the 
financing side as well as the service delivery side.  
Finally, the key to successful public service delivery is adequacy, 
sufficiency, transparent and regular flow of funds to the stake holders in doing 
the business of government. There should be an integration of the other resource 
distributions tied to the development unit. Thus a bottom up approach, including 
all levels of formula, straight transfers and non-formula ad hoc transfers is 
required. This should be accompanied with clearly identified aims and 
objectives of the financing and service delivery assignments; this will lead to an 
optimal level of growth and equity. Government has already focused on the 
devolution of power, which if accompanied with an adequate financial 
devolution would bear maximum economic returns. 
 
Annexures 
ANNEX I 
Article 160. National Finance Commission.  
 (1) Within six months of the commencing day and thereafter at intervals 
not exceeding five years, the President shall constitute a National 
Finance Commission consisting of the Minister of Finance of the 
Federal Government, the Ministers of Finance of the Provincial 
Governments, and such other persons as may be appointed by the 
President after consultation with the Governors of the Provinces.  
 (2) It shall be the duty of the National Finance Commission to make 
recommendations to the President as to- 
 (a) the distribution between the Federation and the Provinces of the 
net proceeds of the taxes mentioned in clause (3);  
 (b) the making of grants-in-aid by the Federal Government to the 
Provincial Governments; 
 (c) the exercise by the Federal Government and the Provincial 
Government of the borrowing powers conferred by the 
Constitution; and  
 (d) any other matter relating to finance referred to the Commission by 
the President.  
 (3) The taxes referred to in paragraph (a) of clause (2) are the following taxes 
raised under the authority of [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)], namely: 
 (i) taxes on income, including corporation tax, but not including 
taxes on income consisting of remuneration paid out of the 
Federal Consolidated Fund;  
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 [(ii) taxes on the sales and purchases of goods imported, exported, 
produced, manufactured on consumed;]  
 (iii) export duties on cotton, and such other export duties as may be 
specified by the President;  
 (iv) such duties of exercise as may be specified by the President; and 
 (v) such other taxes as may be specified by the President. 
 (4) As soon as may be after receiving the recommendations of the 
National Finance Commission, the President shall, by Order, specify, 
in accordance with the recommendations of the Commission under 
paragraph (a) of clause (2), the share of the net proceeds of the taxes 
mentioned in clause (3) which is to be allocated to each Provinces, 
and that share shall be paid to the Government of the Province 
concerned, and, notwithstanding the provision of Article 78 shall not 
form part of the Federal Consolidated Fund. 
 (5) The recommendations of the National Finance Commission, together 
with an explanatory memorandum as to the action taken thereon, shall 
be laid before both Houses and the Provincial Assemblies.  
 (6) At any time before an Order under clause (4) is made, the President 
may, by Order, make such amendments or modifications in the law 
relating to the distribution of revenues between the Federal 
Government and the provincial Governments as he may deem 
necessary or expedient. 
 (7) The President may, by Order, make grants-in-aid of the revenues of 
the Provinces in need of assistance and such grants shall be charged 
upon the Federal Consolidated Fund. 
 
ANNEX II 
 
Table 
Inter-Provincial Distribution under Various NFC Awards 
(Percentage) 
Year Fed/Prov Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan Total 
1974 20:80 60.25 22.50 13.39 3.86 100 
1979 20:80 57.97 23.34 13.39 5.30 100 
1985 Interim 
award 
Interim 
award 
Interim 
award 
Interim 
award 
Interim 
award 
Interim 
award 
1990 20:80 57.87 23.29 13.54 5.30 100 
1996 62.5:37.5 57.88 23.28 13.54 5.30 100 
2000 (not awarded) Interim 
award 
Interim 
award 
Interim 
award 
Interim 
award 
Interim 
award 
Interim 
award 
2006 (estimated) 45:55* 56.07 25.67 13.14 5.13 100 
* Provincial share to be increased by one percent each year till it touch the 50 percent mark. 
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ANNEX III 
 
Table 
Provincial Real GDP per Capita 
 Real GDP per Capita 
Urban ($) 
Real GDP per Capita 
Rural($) 
Punjab 2380 1523 
Sindh 2308 1418 
NWFP 2074 1241 
Balochistan 1837 1653 
Total 2319 1464 
 
ANNEX IV 
 
Table 
Federal/Provincial Revenue Profile 
Year 
Federal Tax 
Revenue 
Provincial 
Tax Revenue 
Federal Non-
tax Revenue 
Provincial 
Non-tax 
Revenue 
1980 31403 1809 4731 559 
1985 57921 3297 15184 1001 
1990 114004 5431 38182 1188 
1995 248059 9833 51395 8645 
2000 386800 18800 90800 16100 
2005 624752 34611 218271 22404 
2006 762800 42800 247200 42800 
Source: Economic Survey (Various Issues). 
 
REFERENCES 
Federal Budget Speech (2007) Federal Budget Speech 2007-08. Ministry of 
Finance. www.finance.gov.pk 
Jaffery, Nighat Bilgrami, and Mahpara Sadaqat (2006) NFC Awards 
Commentary and Agenda. Pakistan Economic and Social Review 44:2,  209–
234. 
Kardar, Shahid (2006) Local Government Finance in Pakistan Post 2001. The 
Lahore Journal of Economics (Special Edition). 
Khan, Mohammad Zubair (2006) Intergovernmental Resource Transfers: 
Prospects and Issues. The Lahore Journal of Economics (Special Edition). 
Pakistan, Government of (1973) Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. 
Government of Pakistan. 
 22
Pakistan, Government of (1991) Report of the National Finance Commission. 
Islamabad: National Finance Commission Secretariat. 
Pakistan, Government of (1996) Report of the National Finance Commission. 
Islamabad: National Finance Commission Secretariat. 
Pakistan, Government of (2006) The Gazette of Pakistan, “An Order further to 
amend the Distribution of Revenues and Grants-in-Aids Order, 1997”. Order 
No.1 of 2006. Ministry of Law, Justice and Human Rights. 
Pakistan, Government of (2006a) (Inter-governmental Fiscal Relation), 
<http://www.mng.gov.pk/icfd/presentations/default.asp> 
Pakistan, Government of (Various Issues) Economic Surveys. Government of 
Pakistan. 
Pasha, Hafiz A., and Aisha Ghaus (1994) Dynamic Budgetary Consequences of 
the 1991 NFC Award. The Pakistan Development Review 33:4,  627–645. 
Sabir, Muhammad (2001) Dynamic Consequences of the 1997 NFC Award: 
Provincial Social Sector Expenditures. The Pakistan Development Review 
40:4,  967–984. 
Sherani, Sakib (2006) Pakistan Fiscal and Monetary System. The Lahore 
Journal of Economics (Special Edition). 
UNDP (2003) National Human Development Report, 2003. United Nations 
Development Programme. 
World Bank (2006) Research study “Rural Service Delivery in Pakistan”. A 
Study for World Bank. 
